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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal scoring of multiple choice tests by using stan-
dard estimation theory where obtained scores are efficient estimators of examinees’
ability. The marks for wrong selections and omissions jointly minimize the mean
square difference between obtained score and ability. Examinees are loss averse, ie.
disproportionately weight the penalty for wrong selection in their utility function,
which entails a preference for omission. With a limited number of items, it is effi-
cient to incentivize the lowest able to omit as their answers essentially reflect noise.
The shorter the test, the stronger the incentives to omit. Loss aversion improves
estimators efficiency by inducing more omission, which reduces the need to bias
the marks to foster omission. The model also sheds new lights on the statistical
properties of two widely used scoring methods: number right and formula scoring.
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1 Introduction
Multiple-choice tests are a popular type of assessment in education. They have several
advantages like fast and easy scoring, wide sampling of the content and grading exempt
from rater bias. A major drawback is the difficulty of dealing with guessing by examinees.
Examinees who have no clues about which answer is right may still select one at random
and reap a point if lucky. More generally, examinees often have partial knowledge and
select answers which they judge to be more likely. While an incorrect selection is always
the result of a lack of knowledge, a correct one may result either from knowing, supposing
or guessing, without the possibility to tell the three apart.
Guessing adds an error component to scores. Suppose that a test-taker has a prob-
ability 0.8 of selecting the right option. She may be lucky and gets an average score of
90%, or unlucky and gets a score of 70%. In both cases, her true ability is mismeasured.
If the number of items is large enough, the law of large numbers applies and ensures that
the measurement error converges to zero. But for practical reasons, most tests have a
limited number of items.
The aim of this paper is to design a scoring rule, a mark which penalizes wrong
selections, so that the measurement error is as low as possible. The task is complicated by
the possibility given to examinees to leave some items blank if they are unsure about the
right option. Omission suppresses the uncertainty due to the chance factor but introduces
another type of measurement error which stems from the impossibility to distinguish
examinees with different levels of partial knowledge. The problem is especially acute if
a significant fraction of examinees omit. An efficient scoring rule should also include a
mark for omission which gives the best estimates of omitters’ ability.
The problem differs from a standard mean estimation procedure as the marks serve
two purposes at once. They provide an estimation of ability through the computation
of a score for each examinee, but they also influence examinees in their choice between
answering and omitting, which in turn changes the conditions under which abilities are
estimated. How do the marks affect incentives also depends on the extent to which
examinees are reluctant to risk answers on the basis of their knowledge. To study to
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what extent those two objectives interact and may possibly conflict, I pose an estimation
model in which the marks jointly minimize the mean square difference between examinees’
scores and abilities.
Several studies have shown that examinees do not answer all items even when ex-
pected mark from guessing is greater than for omitting (Sheriffs and Boomer, 1954, Ebel,
1968, Cross and Frary, 1977, Bliss, 1980, Pekkarinen, 2015). Those observations are not
consistent with examinees being risk neutral score maximizers. A departure from risk
neutrality is introduced by assuming that examinees are loss averse: they dislike receiving
a bad mark by a larger extent than they like getting a full mark when they are right.
This creates a bias toward omission, which consequences for the design of efficient scoring
are investigated.
I find that the efficient scoring rule is fundamentally sensitive to the size of the test.
When a limited number of items is proposed to examinees, answers by the less able are
too noisy to allow accurate estimation of their ability. The efficient mark for omission
is positive to induce them to omit and reveal their low ability. The fewer items, the
more omitters and the higher the mark. Loss aversion generally improves estimators
efficiency by inducing spontaneously more omission and thereby reducing the need to
bias the mark upward to favor omission. When the test has a large sample of questions,
ability of low able examinees is estimated with accuracy when they answer, eliminating
the need to induce them to omit. The mark for omission drops to negative values so
that all examinees answer. The penalty for wrong answers is essentially insensitive to the
number of items and the scoring strategy.
The model sheds new lights on statistical properties of the two most used scoring
methods, number right and formula scoring. Number right scoring (NRS) counts the
number of right selections and divides the sum by the total number of items. Omitted
items and wrong selections count for zero. Formula scoring (FS) imposes a penalty for
incorrect selection equal to −1/(m− 1), where m is the number of options in items. The
formula equalizes the expected scores of pure guessing and omission (Thurstone, 1919,
Holzinger, 1924). I find that the two scoring rules estimate examinees ability with similar
degree of accuracy. On the one hand, FS induces more omission by penalizing mistakes,
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which reduces the error component in a fully efficient model. On the other hand, omitters
ability is poorly estimated with a zero mark for omission. NRS rules out omission, which
is only efficient with a large number of items, but avoids any estimation bias problem
arising from omissions.
While the two scoring methods produce similar measurement errors, they both un-
derperform compared to an efficient scoring rule. I find in a calibrated model that a
test-maker using FS or NRS would have to increase the number of items by on average
30% to obtain the same estimation accuracy than an efficient scoring rule. NRS and FS
share two shortcomings. First they do not adjust the marks for finite sample, that is they
do not induce more omissions when the number of items is smaller. Second they both set
the mark for omission to zero, which induce too much or too few omission, depending of
the length of the test.
Multiple choice tests as an assessment tool have a long history. They were first
administered on a large scale during the World War I by the US Army to quickly identify
the competencies of hundred of thousands of recruits (Ebel, 1979). Its adoption then
spread rapidly in various domains, like intelligence testing (Pintner, 1923) or in education.
Kelly (1916) is the first researcher to report and investigate the use of multiple choice
tests in measuring children reading skills. The standardization of the evaluation process
proved to be particularly adapted to large scale and high stake exams, like the Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT) and Graduate Record Examination (GRE), to take two prominent
examples in the USA.
To what extent tests provide accurate and valid measures of ability, skills or educa-
tional achievement has been studied for more than a century by psychometrics, a research
domain at the intersection of psychology and statistics. Many of its results have been
incorporated into what is regarded today as classical test theory (see e.g. McDonald,
1999). It is based on the central assumption that a person’s obtained score on a test is
the sum of a true score and an error score (Harvill, 1991). It has developed around two
key concepts: reliability and validity. A measure is reliable if it produces similar results
under consistent conditions. Reliable scores are reproducible from one test to another
(Traub and Rowley, 1991). A valid measure is one that measures what it is intended to
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measure.
A voluminous theoretical and empirical literature has applied those concepts to the
properties of different scoring rules (e.g. Diamond and Evans, 1973; Burton, 2001; Lesage
et al., 2013). The superiority of one of those rules to the other is still debated. By imple-
menting negative marking and correcting for guessing behavior, FS encourages omission,
which increases reliability (Lord, 1975, Mattson, 1975, Burton, 2001). Some authors have
argued that FS not only measures the mastery of domain knowledge but also students’
answering strategies and risk-taking behavior (e.g. Votaw, 1936; Frary, 1988; Budescu
and Bar-Hillel, 1993). NRS provides strong incentives to answer all questions, which
minimizes the bias.
By assuming that examinees only differ by their knowledge, and not personality traits
like risk aversion, the present model does not address this issue. Its general aim is to
recast the issue of evaluating ability through multiple choice tests into as standard the
framework of estimation theory as possible. By using as a fitness criterion the mean square
error, the error term can usefully be decomposed into a variance and a bias components.
The model finite and large sample statistical properties can be contrasted. A major
finding to this regard is that the efficient scoring rule takes two different forms with a
limited number of items and a large set of items.
The model departs from psychometric studies in two other ways. First, a special
attention is paid to the interplay between the scoring rule, risk preferences and ability
estimation. In most existing studies, risk preferences are not modeled or when they are,
examinees are risk neutral. By posing the realistic joint assumption of loss aversion and
narrow framing, examinees display a bias toward omission, in accordance with empirical
literature (e.g. Akyol et al., 2016). Second, whereas the literature has essentially focused
on existing scoring rules, mostly FS and NRS, they do not derive the marks for wrong
answers and omission from first principles. They are made endogenous here by making
a distinction between a notional mark for wrong answer, essentially a scaling parameter
which pins the true score down, and actual marks which minimize measurement errors
defined as deviations from true score.
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A few articles have also made the marks endogenous. Espinosa and Gardeazabal
(2010) simulate a model of optimal scoring with heterogeneous risk aversion and varying
item difficulty and find a relatively high penalty to dissuade guessing. Budescu and Bo
(2015) also simulate a model of optimal scoring but with different assumptions (heteroge-
neous loss aversion and miscalibration of probabilities). They find that a negative penalty
aggravates the score bias and standard deviation, and decreases the correlation between
simulated and true scores. Akyol, Key and Krishna (2016) model the test-taking behav-
ior of students in the field, and use the model to estimate their risk preferences. They
then simulate counterfactual scoring rules and find that increasing the penalty for wrong
answer has a significant impact on omission, which in turn improves estimation of exam-
inees’ ability. Risk aversion heterogeneity has little influence on simulated scores, which
makes the case for negative penalty. In those articles, only the penalty for wrong answers
may vary, whereas both the marks for wrong answers and omission are endogenous in the
present model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the scoring
model and its basic ingredients: true score, loss aversion and mean squared error. Section
3 put forth several analytical properties of the efficient scoring model. Section 4 calibrates
a stylized model and presents simulation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Scoring model
2.1 Scoring rule
A test composed of n items is taken by examinees. Each item has m possible answers,
one correct and m− 1 incorrect. Items are supposed to be well written, without obvious
answers, traps, or ambiguous formulations. Options are correctly randomized within each
item. There is enough time for all questions to be answered. I assume further that all
items are of equal difficulty, so that examinees have a constant probability p of answering
correctly any of them. The probability varies across examinees and is a measure of their
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ability in the content area covered by the test. The test-maker’s objective is to design a
scoring rule so that examinees receive a score as close as possible to their ability. Every
item has three possible outcomes to which are assigned specific marks. The mark given to
a correct selection is normalized to 1. The mark assigned to wrong selections is denoted
θ and the one to omissions γ. Minimal restrictions are imposed on the marks:
θ ≤ γ < 1
The final score is the summation of marks obtained in all item divided by the number
n of items. Let us consider an examinee who never omits. The number of right selections
is the random variable x˜ which follows a binomial distribution B(n, p) with p examinee’s
probability of a correct selection. Examinees’ score is the sum x˜ ∈ [0, n] of right answers,
plus the sum of wrong answers n− x˜ weighted by the penalty θ, divided by the number
of items:
s˜ =
x˜+ (n− x˜)θ
n
(1)
The score’s first two moments, given success rate p, are E(s˜; p) = p + (1 − p)θ and
V (s˜; p) = 1
n
(1− θ)2p(1− p).
2.2 True score
True score depends on examinee’s ability p. It is the observed score’s component unin-
fluenced by random events (Harvill, 1991) or the score an examinee would get if p were
observable:
s(p) = p+ (1− p)θ∗ (2)
with θ∗ < 1 a notional mark which would prevail in absence of measurement errors.
The notional mark is free here from normative justification. It is essentially a scaling
parameter which does not affect the way examinees are ranked relative to each other.
What will matter for estimation efficiency will be how actual marks for wrong answers
and omissions relate to the notional mark.
7
To fix ideas, the notional mark may take a reference value borrowed from one of the
two most used scoring rules, number right scoring (NRS) or formula scoring (FS). In NRS,
the final mark is the number of right answers, implying θ∗ = 0 and s(p) = p. If examinees
without any knowledge select an option at random, their expected score is positive and
equal to the probability of picking the right option among m ones: E(s(1/m)) = 1/m.
FS aims at removing in expectation the reward from pure guessing. It imposes the
penalty θ∗ = −1/(m − 1) whenever an incorrect answer is selected, so that examinee’s
expected score is zero with pure guessing:
E
(
s
( 1
m
))
=
1
m
− m− 1
m
1
m− 1 = 0
If some examinees are misinformed or have false knowledge, they could perform worse
than selecting an option at random. The minimal ability p would lie between 0 and
1/m in this case. NRS also rewards misinformation, albeit to a lesser extent than pure
guessing. Misinformed examinees would obtain a negative mark in expectation under FS.
Misinformation is ruled out in the following by assuming that examinees’ lowest ability,
denoted p0, is equal to 1/m.
2.3 Risk Preferences
Omission delivers a sure mark compared to selection, unless examinees are sure about
which option is right. The choice between a sure outcome and a risky one is modeled
through three assumptions. First, examinees get utility u(x) from mark x of every item,
and not from average or aggregate score. Narrow framing (Tversky and Kahnemman,
1981), the assumption that people do not pool all sources of risk before deciding, has
proven useful in various contexts of decision involving multiple risks (Tversky and Kah-
nemman, 1981, Read, Loewenstein and Rabin, 1999).
Second, examinees focus on losses and gains and overweight losses. They are more
affected by negative outcomes than by positive ones of same magnitude. Loss aversion
is a central feature of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory of how people
evaluate risks. Its validity is based on extensive experimental evidence, particularly
8
when associated with narrow framing. Bereby-Meyer, Meyer and Flascher (2002) provide
evidence of narrow framing and loss aversion in the context of exam taking.1
Third, the utility derived from a positive or negative mark is linear. Applied to the
context of exam taking, the utility loss associated with being wrong is larger than the
utility gain of being right or omitting: u(1) = 1, u(γ) = γ and u(θ) = λθ, with λ the
coefficient of loss aversion.
A wrong selection is edited as a loss by examinees whatever the mark’s sign: λ > 1 if
θ ≤ 0 and λ < 1 if θ > 0. Loss aversion is synthetically defined by the sign condition
θ(λ− 1) ≤ 0
Loss neutrality is equivalent to risk neutrality, a limit case of risk preferences with
λ = 1. Loss averse examinees do not like risk. They always prefer a sure mark to a
random one with the same expectation.
Given a scoring rule {γ, θ}, omitting is preferred to responding if its mark is greater
than the loss-weighted expected mark of a response:
γ > p+ (1− p)λθ
Marginal examinees are test-takers whose ability p¯ makes them indifferent between
selecting and omitting:
γˆ = p¯+ (1− p¯)λθˆ
Compared to the case of risk neutrality, loss aversion raises the threshold probability
p¯:
p¯ =
γ − λθ
1− λθ >
γ − θ
1− θ (3)
Examinees omit when they are not confident enough in their selection: p ≤ p¯, which
depends positively on the mark γ and negatively on penalty θ.
1 See also Budescu and Bo (2015). The joint assumption that people tend to focus on individual gains
and losses rather than on average outcomes is sometimes labeled myopic loss aversion (Barberis, Huang,
and Thaler, 2006; Barberis and Huang, 2008). Narrow framing is also in accordance with observations
showing that individuals do not become risk neutral when they take large tests involving many inde-
pendent items, which risk vanishes once aggregated (Pekkarinen, 2015; Akyol, Key and Krishna, 2016;
Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2018).
9
2.4 Mean squared error
Examinees’ true score is either estimated thanks to respondents’ success rate, or by
assigning a constant mark to omissions, which exploits the fact that omitting reveals a
low ability on average. Both methods produce error measurements.
Consider first an examinee whose ability is p > p¯. Because her ability does not vary
across items and all items have the same difficulty, she answers all of them and gets the
score s˜ defined in (1). The score is interpreted as a point linear estimator of true score
s(p). Its quality can be measured by common statistical methods and optimized by the
adequate choice of the marks θ and γ. The mean squared error (MSE) of observed score
s˜ taken by examinee with ability p is the average squared difference between s˜ and true
score s(p):
mse(θ; p) = E
((
s˜− s(p))2) (4)
MSE is a commonly used measure of estimators performance. It is analytically
tractable and lends itself to the intuitive decomposition:
E
(
(s˜− s(p))2) = V (s˜; p) + (E(s˜; p)− s(p))2 (5)
The first component is observed score’s variance. The second one is squared bias,
which measures by how far the expected score deviates from its theoretical mean. The
MSE criterion controls this way both for sample fluctuations and estimator’s accuracy.
MSE of an unbiased score (E(s˜) = s(p)) is equal to score’s variance.
Consider now a test-taker whose ability is p ≤ p¯. Because her ability is constant across
items, she omits all of them and gets the score γ. She would obtain the true score s(p)
if her ability was perfectly measured. Hence examinee’s quadratic error is the squared
deviation of γ from true score s(p), or squared bias:
sb(γ; p) =
(
s(p)− γ)2 (6)
While individual abilities are not observed by the test-maker, their distribution is
assumed to be known. Let f(p) denote the ability probability density function. The test-
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maker chooses the marks θ and γ so as to minimize the MSE averaged over examinees:
min
γ,θ
MSE(γ, θ) =
∫ p¯
p0
sb(γ; p)f(p)dp+
∫ 1
p¯
mse(θ; p)f(p)dp
=
∫ p¯
p0
(
s(p)− γ)2f(p)dp+ ∫ 1
p¯
E
((
s˜− s(p))2)f(p)dp (7)
Like the MSE component from answers, the MSE component from omissions, normal-
ized by their proportion F (p¯) in the population, lends itself to a decomposition:
1
F (p¯)
∫ p¯
p0
(
s(p)− γ)2f(p)dp = E|omit((s(p)− γ)2)
= V|omit
(
s(p)
)
+
(
s¯(p)− γ)2 (8)
where E|omit is expectation conditional on examinees being omitters. s¯(p) is omitters’
average ability:
s¯(p) = E|omit
(
s(p)
)
=
1
F (p¯)
∫ p¯
p0
s(p)f(p)dp (9)
and V|omit
(
s(p)
)
= E|omit
(
(s(p)− s¯(p))2) is the conditional variance of omitters’ ability.
Total omitters’ measurement error has two components. The variance term classically
measures how far omitters’ ability deviates from its mean. The more omitters (the higher
p¯), the larger the dispersion and the higher the MSE. The second term is squared bias
which measures by how far the mark deviates from omitters’ average ability.
Given a proportion F (p¯) of omitters, the MSE is minimized for γˆ = s¯(p). When the
proportion F (p¯) is endogenous and responds to variations of the marks, we will see that
it may be efficient to bias γˆ to induce more or less omission.
It also follows that, as long as some examinees omit, the variance term in (8) is a lower
bound whatever the number of items that compose the test. This is a major difference
with the MSE component from answers where the average error can be brought to zero
with n large enough.
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3 Efficient scoring
3.1 Optimality conditions
Assume that a non-empty group of examinees with ability p ∈ [p0, p¯] omit. First order
conditions of the minimization program (7) are:
∂MSE
∂γ
(γ, θ) =
(
sb(γˆ; p¯)−mse(θˆ; p¯))dp¯
dγ
f(p¯) +
∫ p¯
p0
∂sb
∂γ
(γˆ; p)f(p)dp = 0
∂MSE
∂θ
(γ, θ) =
(
sb(γˆ; p¯)−mse(θˆ; p¯))dp¯
dθ
f(p¯) +
∫ 1
p¯
∂mse
∂θ
(θˆ; p)f(p)dp = 0
or
∂MSE
∂γ
=
(
sb(γˆ; p¯)−mse(θˆ; p¯)) 1
1− λθˆf(p¯) + 2
∫ p¯
p0
(
γˆ − s(p))f(p)dp = 0 (10)
∂MSE
∂θ
= −(sb(γˆ; p¯)−mse(θˆ; p¯))(1− p¯)λ
1− λθˆ f(p¯)
+ 2
∫ 1
p¯
(
(1− p)2(θˆ − θ∗)− 1
n
p(1− p)(1− θˆ)
)
f(p)dp = 0 (11)
The common term in the two equations
sb(γˆ; p¯)−mse(θˆ; p¯) = (γˆ − s(p¯))2 − E[(s˜− s(p¯))2]
=
(
γˆ − s(p¯))2 − (V (s˜; p¯) + (E(s˜; p¯)− s(p¯))2)
=
(
γˆ − (p¯+ (1− p¯)θ∗))2 − ( 1
n
(1− θˆ)2p¯(1− p¯) + (1− p¯)2(θˆ − θ∗)2
)
(12)
is a replacement effect caused by marginal examinees with ability p¯ changing their choice
from selection to omission. This impacts the MSE by substituting a measurement error
from answering by one from omitting. dp¯/dγ and dp¯/dθ are the effects of a variation of
γ and θ on threshold probability p¯ (see (3)). Raising γ or reducing θ both encourage
omission and expand the group of omitters:
dp¯
dγ
=
1
1− λθˆ > 0
−dp¯
dθ
=
(1− p¯)λ
1− λθˆ > 0
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Two model’s particular cases are of interest. In the first case, examinees’ ability is
estimated without omission (Subsection 3.2). In the second case, omission is allowed, but
the number of items included in the test is arbitrarily large (Subsection 3.3).
3.2 No omission
As a preliminary analysis, let us assume that the mark γ is set so that no examinees
find preferable to omit, even the least knowledgeable ones whose ability is p0: γ ≤
p0 + (1− p0)λθ. A possible scoring rule which satisfies this property has the same mark
for omission and wrong selection: γ = θ. An example is NRS where the two marks
equal zero and for which it is never optimal to omit. We are left with one endogenous
parameter, the mark θ, which minimizes the MSE:
min
θ
MSE(θ) =
∫ 1
p0
mse(θ; p)f(p)dp =
∫ 1
p0
V (s˜; p) + [E(s˜; p)− s(p)]2f(p)dp
=
∫ 1
p0
( 1
n
(1− θ)2p(1− p) + (1− p)2(θ − θ∗)2
)
f(p)dp
The variance term V (s˜; p) is minimized by θ = 1 and the squared bias by θ = θ∗.
Hence, the efficient mark θˆ lies somewhere between those two values. After some calcu-
lations, θˆ satisfies:
θˆ − θ∗
1− θˆ =
1
n
∫ 1
p0
p(1− p)f(p)dp∫ 1
p0
(1− p)2f(p)dp (13)
Proposition 1 (i) θ∗ < θˆ < 1, (ii) θˆ decreases with n and (iii) θˆ → θ∗ when n→∞.
Proof (i): the right hand term of (13) is positive. The case θˆ > 1 is ruled out by θ∗ < 1.
(ii) and (ii) are straightforward from Condition (13). 
A reduced penalty (a higher θ) lowers the score’s variance, which is traded off against
accuracy. The resulting score lessens the penalty, compared to a scoring with the notional
mark: θˆ > θˆ∗. Contrary to the variance, the bias is independent of n. Hence when
n increases, its relative weight in the MSE also increases, which makes the bias more
costly. In other words, as more items are included in the test, abilities are estimated
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with increasing precision, making less necessary to bias the mark to reduce statistical
fluctuations.
3.3 Large sample properties
When the number of items in the test is arbitrarily large, scores are perfect estimators of
ability. Omission should be discouraged as a result, except in a borderline case.
Proposition 2 θˆ → θ∗ when n→∞; γˆ < p0 +(1−p0)λθ∗ if λ > 1, or γˆ ≤ p0 +(1−p0)θ∗
if λ = 1.
Proof The MSE minization program is:
min
γ,θ
MSE(γ, θ) = min
γ,θ
∫ p¯
p0
(
γ − (p+ (1− p)θ∗)
)2
f(p)dp
+
∫ 1
p¯
( 1
n
(1− θ)2p(1− p) + (1− p)2(θ − θ∗)2
)
f(p)dp
The variance term asymptotically tends to zero with n:
lim
n→∞
MSE =
∫ p¯
p0
(
γ − (p+ (1− p)θ∗)
)2
f(p)dp+
∫ 1
p¯
(
(1− p)2(θ − θ∗)2
)
f(p)dp
The MSE is minimized for θˆ = θ∗ and γˆ < p0+(1−p0)λθ∗ such that all examinees answer,
implying that the first integral is zero. If λ = 1, the condition γˆ = (p0 + (1 − p0)λθ∗
allows the least knowledgeable to omit since their MSE is also zero in this case. 
When the number of items is arbitrarily large, respondents’ abilities are accurately
estimated. To the contrary, omitters create measurement errors which do not vanish with
test length, since omission signals low ability only on average.
Under risk neutrality (λ = 1), the unbiasedness condition for the least able coincides
with the incentives given to them to omit. If γˆ = p0 + (1 − p0)θ∗, they are indifferent
between answering and omitting. If they omit, they get the unbiased mark γˆ = p0 + (1−
p0)θ
∗ = s(p0). If they answer, they obtain the same score p0 + (1− p0)θ∗. It results that
efficient marks may indifferently induce the least able to answer or to omit.
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3.4 Finite sample properties
When the number of items is finite, examinees’ ability is estimated with errors due to
finite-sample fluctuations. How does it affect efficient marks θ and γ? A major deter-
minant is the sign of the replacement effect presented in Subsection 3.1. A negative
replacement effect means that the MSE is reduced when marginal examinees switch from
selection to omission. Lemma 1 indicates under which condition the replacement effect
is negative.
Lemma 1 sb(γˆ; p¯) − mse(θˆ; p¯) < 0 if (i) λ = 1, or (ii) θˆ > θ∗ and 0 < −θˆ(λ − 1) ≤
2(θˆ − θ∗).
Proof sb(γˆ; p¯)−mse(θˆ; p¯) < 0 if (γˆ − s(p¯))2 < (E(s˜; p¯)− s(p¯))2 + V (s˜; p¯) (see (12)). If
λ = 1, γˆ = E(s˜; p¯), the two biases cancel off exactly, sb(γˆ; p¯)−mse(θˆ; p¯) < 0. If λ is close
enough to 1: 0 < θ∗ < θˆ implies 0 < p¯+(1−p¯)θ∗ < p¯+(1−p¯)λθˆ < p¯+(1−p¯)θˆ and therefore
0 < γˆ − s(p¯) < E(s˜; p¯) − s(p¯). Higher loss aversion reduces γˆ further and the bias sign
may reverse: γˆ < s(p¯). The replacement effect is still negative if s(p¯)− γˆ ≤ E(s˜; p¯)−s(p¯),
or, after some calculations, if −θˆ(λ− 1) ≤ 2(θˆ − θ∗). 
Omission by marginal examinees entails an estimation bias as the corresponding mark
γˆ = p¯+ (1− p¯)λθˆ typically differs from true score s(p¯) = p¯+ (1− p¯)θ∗. But if examinees
are risk neutral or if they are moderately loss averse (with −θˆ(λ − 1) a measure of loss
aversion), and the penalty is above the notional mark, the bias from omitting is lower
than the measurement error from answering. It can be proved in this case that omission
by the less able examinees is efficient:
Proposition 3 γˆ > p0 + (1− p0)λθˆ if −θˆ(λ− 1) < 2(θˆ − θ∗).
Proof If γˆ = p0 + (1 − p0)λθˆ, all examinees answer, except possibly the least able
whose ability is p0. Without omission, the efficient penalty, denoted θˆA satisfies θˆA > θ∗
(Condition 13). Given θˆA, omission by the least able is efficient if −θˆA(λ−1) < 2(θˆA−θ∗)
(Lemma 1). For γˆ = p¯ + (1 − p¯)λθˆA > p0 + (1 − p0)λθˆA, the replacement effect remains
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negative under the same condition. First order condition (10), with γˆA the efficient mark
given θˆA, writes:
(
sb(γˆA; p¯)−mse(θˆA; p¯)
) γˆA
1− λθˆA
f(p¯) + 2
∫ p¯
p0
(
γˆA − s(p)
)
f(p)dp = 0
implying γˆA > s¯(p) (see (9)) if the replacement effect is negative. Let pˆ denote average
omitters’ ability. γˆA > pˆ+(1− pˆ)θˆA ≥ pˆ+(1− pˆ)λθˆA > p0 +(1−p0)λθˆA. Hence, omission
by the less able is efficient, given penalty θˆA. Now let {γˆ, θˆ} be efficient marks, solution of
optimality conditions (10) and (11). Suppose ad absurdum that γˆ ≤ p0+(1−p0)λθˆ, hence
θˆ = θˆA, but we have just proved that MSE(γˆA, θˆA) < MSE(γ, θˆA) ∀γ ≤ p0 + (1− p0)λθˆ if
−θˆ(λ− 1) < 2(θˆ − θ∗), hence {γˆ, θˆ} cannot be efficient. 
It is efficient that the less knowledgeable omit if they are not too loss averse. Since
those examinees select options with no or little knowledge, their score essentially reflects
noise. It is therefore efficient to induce them to omit and thereby reveal their low ability.
The superiority of omission for the less able breaks if loss aversion exceeds a certain level.
Fig. 1 (in Appendix II) explains why. If examinees are risk neutral (diagram (a)),
estimated ability of marginal omitters and respondents are equally biased: γˆ − s(p¯) =
E(s˜; p¯) − s(p¯). The mark γˆ is biased upward to induce examinees to omit, but so is
respondents’ score s˜. If examinees are loss averse (diagram (b)), the mark γˆ is moving
to the left. The resulting omission bias is lower than the answer bias. Compared to
loss neutrality, more examinees spontaneously omit, which limits the need for rewarding
omission and distorting γ. Hence moderate loss aversion improves efficiency compared
to loss neutrality. If examinees are "excessively" loss averse (diagram (c)), the mark γˆ
is now moving away from true score and the omission bias may become larger than the
answer bias. The mark is not intended to foster omission anymore, but to refrain too
many examinees to omit. Its value is so low that it becomes a poor estimate of omitters’
ability, which makes omission inefficient.
Lemma 1 shows that if examinees are not too loss averse, inducing more examinees
to omit improves efficiency. A direct consequence is that the mark γˆ is greater than
omitters’ average ability s¯(p) (defined in (9)).
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Proposition 4 γˆ > s¯(p) if −θˆ(λ− 1) < 2(θˆ − θ∗).
Proof First order condition (10) is:
2
∫ p¯
p0
(
γˆ − s(p))f(p)dp = −(sb(γˆ; p¯)−mse(θˆ; p¯)) γˆ
1− λθˆf(p¯) > 0
if the replacement effect is negative. It follows:
γˆ >
1
F (p¯)
∫ p¯
p0
s(p)f(p)dp = s¯(p)

It is efficient to bias the mark upward to induce more omission.
4 Simulated properties
4.1 Simulation strategy
This section presents some numerical results from the statistical model of scoring. Regard-
ing risk preferences, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate a loss aversion coefficient
λ = 2.25 in cumulative prospect theory. It is however not entirely clear how a parameter
estimated from choices involving monetary outcomes translates to the context of grades.
I assume three conservative and plausible levels of loss aversion: loss neutrality (λ = 1),
moderate loss aversion (λ = 1.5) and stronger loss aversion (λ = 2.5). In the cases where
a mistake is positively marked (θ > 0), it is assumed to be still edited as a loss. The
mark is reduced by the coefficient 1/λ in this case.
Actual ability distributions are expected to vary with test’s difficulty relative to exami-
nees’ proficiency. Some distribution may be U-shaped with two modes close to the bounds
(absence of knowledge and perfect ability), others bell-shaped with a higher proportion
of examinees around mean ability. Estimating the ability distribution from real tests is
beyond the scope of this article. Without population and exam-specific informations, I
choose a simple uniform distribution over the space of ability [p0, 1].
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The MSE (7) is computed over a double grid of values for parameters θ ∈ [θ, θ∗]
and p¯ ∈ [1/m, 1]. The mark γ is retrieved for each couple (θ, p¯) by the condition γ =
p¯+(1− p¯)λθ. The two grids are composed of 2500 points each, so that 25002 = 6, 250, 000
different values of MSE are computed. The efficient marks correspond to the lowest value
calculated.
I use as a metric of fitness the root mean square error (RMSE):
RMSE(γ, θ) =
√∫ p¯
p0
(
γ − s(p))2f(p)dp+ ∫ 1
p¯
E
(
(s˜− s(p))2)f(p)dp
It is the geometric mean of measurement errors for all examinees. A RMSE of 0.10 for
instance means that obtained scores deviate on average from true scores by this amount,
which can be compared to the scales of a full point if a right answer and the notional
mark θ∗ (classically equal to −1/(m− 1) or 0) if a wrong one.
I also compute the bias on omitters’ score γˆ− s¯(p), which is estimated omitters’ ability
minus average omitters’ ability s¯(p) (see its expression (9)). It informs about to what
extent omission is fostered (if positive) or dissuaded (if negative). The bias depends on
the incentives to omit, which is measured by the mark differential γ − θ.
4.2 Efficient scoring
I first study a baseline model in which the test is composed of various numbers of items
(n = 1, 5, 10, 20, 40, 80, 200, ∞). Each item has m = 3 options. True score s(p) is
computed for notional mark θ∗ = −1/(m − 1), which corrects for pure guessing, as in
formula scoring. Loss aversion coefficient is set to 1.5.
Table 10 in Appendix I presents the efficient marks and main statistics in function of
n for the baseline calibration. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 display the full profile of mark γˆ and
the proportion of omitters respectively in function of n.
Two distinct scoring strategies emerge. When the number of items is below a threshold
(here less than 170) omission is encouraged to palliate inaccurate estimation of low able
examinees ability. The mark for omission is positive and above average omitters’ ability.
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Except for very limited number of items, it slowly decreases around 0.1 (Fig. 2). The
proportion of omitters is also decreasing with n (Fig. 3). When the test has a large
number of items, omission is dissuaded altogether. The mark for omission drops to
negative values, around −0.15. The mark differential γˆ − θˆ is reduced from around 0.6
to 0.33. The proportion of omitters follows logically the same profile with a sudden fall
to zero, the efficient proportion for large sample. All examinees answer, including the
lowest able.
Except for the extreme case n = 1 where the mark differential is 2.4 and 83.5% of
examinees omit, the efficient penalty θˆ is greater (milder) than notional mark θ∗ (Table
10). It lies in the close neighborhood of the notional mark, which suggests that a scoring
rule with a fixed penalty equal to the notional mark might prove a good approximation
of the efficient rule (more in Subsection 4.6). The penalty for wrong answers varies little
with n, compared to the mark for omission. The behavior of low able is indeed better
targeted by the mark for omission than by the penalty which impacts all examinees,
including the most proficient who will always answer.
Efficient scoring departs from actual scoring rules like number right scoring (NRS) or
formula scoring (FS) in two ways. First, the marks are adjusted for finite sample, which
seems particularly relevant for tests of small and medium sizes. In FS or NRS, the marks
are fixed whatever the test length. Second, a mark for omission set to zero is not efficient.
It is either positive and even biased upward to foster omission or conversely negative to
dissuade omission (Fig. 2). For n not too large, the efficient value of γ is strictly positive
for two reasons. First, insofar as a significant proportion of examinees omit, the mark
should reflect omitters’ average ability and credit partial knowledge. Second, it exceeds
omitters’ average ability in order to foster omission further, which has been shown to
reduce measurement errors in the analytical section (Prop. 4).
The quantitative importance of adjusting for test length and setting γ above zero can
be evaluated by comparing measurement errors of efficient scoring with notional penalty
θ∗ = −1/(m− 1), and FS where actual penalty is −1/(m− 1) and the mark for omission
is fixed and equal to zero. Table 1 extracts root mean squared errors (defined in (4.1))
from Tables 10 and 18 with m = 3 options.
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Table 1: Efficient scoring vs formula scoring with moderate loss aversion and 3 options
per item
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
Efficient scoring RMSE 0.386 0.221 0.166 0.122 0.089 0.066 0.046 0.00
Formula scoring RMSE 0.584 0.263 0.187 0.134 0.097 0.072 0.051 0.031
Compensated nb of items 3 7 13 25 48 99 285 -
Variation rate (%) 200 40 30 25 20 24 42 -
Notes. Examinees are moderately loss averse (λ = 1.5). Efficient scoring: notional mark
corrects for pure guessing (θ∗ = −0.50). See Table 10 for detailed statistics. Formula
scoring: the penalty corrects for pure guessing (θ = −0.50), the mark for omission is
set to zero (γ = 0), no adjustment is made for finite sample. See Table 18 for detailed
statistics. RMSE: root mean squared error. Compensated nb of items: number of items
which must be added to the test with FS to achieve the same level of accuracy than the
efficient test. Variation rate: rate of increase of the number of supplementary items.
As expected, measurement errors are larger with formula scoring than with efficient
scoring. The efficiency loss is significant for tests with a limited number of items due to
a lack of omission in formula scoring. The proportion of omitters is constant and equal
to 14.3% (Table 18), compared to 25% with efficient scoring and n = 20 (Table 10), and
18.6% with n = 80. Insufficient omission comes from a too low mark differential γ − θ
equal to 0.50, compared to 0.61 for n = 20 and 0.57 for n = 40 with efficient marks.
The error differences between the two scoring rules are decreasing with n and become
negligible in absolute terms for n > 40, except for very large n where a bias on omitters
ability still remains with FS. Table 1’s third and fourth lines show a persistent difference
once expressed in additional items FS must include to perform as well as efficient scoring.
The rate of increase is between 20% for n = 40 and 42% for n = 200.
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4.3 Efficient scoring and risk preferences
To what extent risk preferences interact with the scoring rule and estimators efficiency?
Loss averse examinees overweight utility loss from mistakes, which generates a preference
for omission. Its consequences for omission are however ambivalent when the scoring
rule is efficient. On the one hand, the proportion of omitters increases with loss aversion
(Table 2). For n = 20, it is 14.4% if examinees are risk neutral (λ = 1), 24.9% if they
are loss averse (λ = 1.5), and up to 32.8% if they are strongly loss averse (λ = 2.5). On
the other hand, the stronger loss aversion, the smaller the number of items above which
omission is dissuaded. Omission is discouraged for n > 171 if examinees are moderately
loss averse, and as soon as n > 57 if they are strongly loss averse.
Table 2: Proportion of omitters and loss aversion
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
risk neutrality (%) 43.4 26.0 19.6 14.4 10.5 7.6 4.9 0.00
moderate loss aversion 83.5 39.4 30.6 24.9 21.1 18.6 0.00 0.00
strong loss aversion 85.7 46.8 38.0 32.8 29.9 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes. Baseline model: m = 3 options per item, notional mark corrects for pure guessing
(θ∗ = −0.50). Risk neutrality: λ = 1; moderate loss aversion: λ = 1.5; strong loss
aversion: λ = 2.5. See Tables 9, 10 and 11 for detailed statistics. Reading: 26% of risk
neutral examinees omit in a test with 5 items.
The reason is explained in Subsection 3.4 and Fig. 1. When examinees are loss averse,
the mark which induces the less able to omit is below the unbiased mark. The more loss
averse, the larger the discrepancy and the omission bias. The analytical part has also
shown that, at least for moderate levels, loss aversion enhances efficiency, as omission by
low able examinees is obtained by distorting less the mark for omission (see Prop. 3).
Root mean squared errors (RMSE) are reported in Table 3 for three loss aversion
levels. They are decreasing with loss aversion for tests with a limited number of items
n ≤ 40. There are no visible differences for tests with larger n.
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Table 3: Root mean squared error and loss aversion
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
risk neutrality 0.406 0.241 0.181 0.133 0.097 0.070 0.045 0.00
moderate loss aversion 0.386 0.221 0.166 0.122 0.089 0.066 0.046 0.00
strong loss aversion 0.324 0.196 0.151 0.119 0.097 0.072 0.046 0.00
Notes. Baseline model: m = 3 options per item, notional mark corrects for pure guessing
(θ∗ = −0.50). Risk neutrality: λ = 1; moderate loss aversion: λ = 1.5; strong loss
aversion: λ = 2.5. RMSE: root mean squared error. See Tables 9, 10 and 11 for detailed
statistics.
4.4 Number right and formula scoring
The model allows a comparison of the two most used scoring methods, NRS (θ = γ = 0)
and formula scoring (θ = −1/(m−1) and γ = 0), in which the marks are not adjusted for
test length. In NRS, omissions earn zero points, whereas a response can never earn less,
while affording a positive probability of earning a point. Hence rational examinees should
answer all items, whatever their level of loss aversion.2 Omission is also sub-optimal under
FS but only if examinees are risk neutral.
With no omission, the two scoring rules are equivalent. FS is a mere rescaling of NRS
which does not affect examinees’ relative standings. Certainly, the root mean square
deviation (RMSE) with NRS is smaller than the one with FS (compare Tables 16 and
17), but the difference is entirely explained by FS spreading marks over a broader interval
(between −1/(m− 1) and 1) than NRS (between 0 and 1).
The two scoring rules are not equivalent anymore when examinees are loss averse.
Contrary to NRS, FS penalizes wrong answers, which discourages low able examinees to
answer. In the numerical baseline, the proportion of omitters is 14.3% for moderate loss
aversion (Table 18) and 25% for stronger loss aversion (Table 19).
2 This is true if mistakes and omissions are treated the same manner by loss averse examinees, either
as a loss or as a gain, which is plausible given that the two results receive the same mark. The alternative
assumption, not investigated here, that only wrong selections are edited as a loss could explain why some
examinees still omit despite the answers being not penalized (Grandy, 1987).
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Although the two scoring rules cannot be compared prima facie, they differ by the
way omission is treated relatively to answering. NRS dissuades omission by setting the
mark differential γ − θ to zero, whereas FS gives some incentives to omit by raising the
mark for omission above the one for incorrect answer. The effect of fostering omission
on efficiency can be isolated by comparing two scoring rules which differ only by the
way omission is rewarded compared to answering. To do so, FS with m = 3 options,
θ = −0.50 and γ = 0 is compared to a scoring method, called extended NRS, with the
same mark for mistakes and omissions (θ = γ = −0.50). The two methods having the
same mark for mistakes, the scores are spread over comparable intervals.
Table 4: RMSE in formula scoring and extended number right scoring
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
FS, risk neutrality 0.645 0.289 0.204 0.144 0.102 0.072 0.046 0.00
FS, loss aversion 0.584 0.263 0.187 0.134 0.097 0.072 0.051 0.031
FS, strong loss aversion 0.497 0.243 0.189 0.155 0.135 0.124 0.117 0.111
Extended NRS 0.645 0.289 0.204 0.144 0.102 0.072 0.046 0.00
Notes. RMSE: root mean squared errors. 3 options per item. FS: the penalty corrects
for pure guessing (θ = −0.50), the mark for omission is set to zero (γ = 0). See Tables
17, 18 and 19 for detailed statistics. Extended NRS: penalty θ and mark for omission
γ both set to −1/(m − 1) = −0.50. No adjustment made for finite sample. It is never
optimal to omit under extended NRS, whatever the level of loss aversion.
Table 4 does not show any difference between FS with risk neutrality and extended
NRS. The two scoring methods dissuade omission and score mistakes the same way. With
loss aversion, FS induces the less able to omit. Analytical results suggest that some extent
of omission may reduce estimation errors, except here that the mark for omission is not
set to its efficient value. The bias on omitters’ estimated ability γˆ − s¯(p) is −0.07 with
moderate loss aversion (λ = 1.5) and −0.17 with strong loss aversion (λ = 2.5), whereas
it is positive with an efficient scoring. The reverse bias offsets potential efficiency gains
from omission and deteriorates RMSE. One may conclude that, once NRS is modified so
that scores are spread over the same intervals as FS, FS performs better with a limited
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number of items and worse with a large sample of items, a situation where omission
should generally be discouraged.
4.5 Efficient scoring and test length
How many items should a test include? How many options per item? Is there a trade-off
between the two margins? While the first question has been rarely investigated in the
psychometric literature,3 the optimal number of options per item has been discussed at
length (see Rodriguez (2005) for a survey).
Increasing the number of response options generally increases the difficulty of the
item (assuming all the alternatives are plausible), which increases the likelihood that a
test-taker will select a distractor item. Pure guessing becomes more hazardous. The
probability of picking the right option is 50% with two options, down to 20% with five
options. At the other extremity, perfectly informed examinees retrieve the right option
whatever the number of distractors. This suggests that examinees with partial knowledge
are expected to be confused by a higher number of distractors, but to a lesser extent they
are more able.
Varying the number of options from m to m′ > m changes the success rate of pure
guessing and therefore minimal ability from p0 = 1/m to p′0 = 1/m′ < p0. Let us consider
an examinee whose ability is p < 1 with m options and p′ < p with m′ > m options.
Assuming that examinees relative standings remain the same whatever the number of
distractors: F (p′) = F (p), stretching the interval of probability from [p0, 1] to [p′0, 1]
mechanically reduces the probability of a correct answer.
In the baseline model with a uniform ability distribution, the assumption F (p′) = F (p)
gives the new probability p′ in function of p, given m and m′, or p0 and p′0:
p′ = p′0 +
1− p′0
1− p0 (p− p0)
Fig. 4 plots examinees ability in function of their relative rank for tests with two and
3 Burton and Miller (1999) is an exception.
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five options per item. In accordance with intuition, the more able an examinee, the less
affected by the inclusion of additional options per item. For instance, low able examinees
whose rank is F (p) = 0.1 have a probability of 55% of correctly answering with two
options, and 28% with five options. At the other extremity, examinees whose rank F (p)
is 0.9 have 95% chance of success with two options, and still 92% with five options.
Fig. 5 shows how fast the root mean squared error (RMSE) declines with the number
of items for m = 2, 3, 4 and 5 options per item. Efficiency gains from additional items are
large for tests with few items, less than 25, whatever the number of options per item. The
gains then decelerate rapidly and reach a quasi-plateau. The RMSE eventually converges
to zero but very slowly. It is around 0.05 for n = 200 and m = 3, and still 0.03 for
n = 1000. Tests with more than 100 items do not seem to be worth devising, considering
the time spent to construct and administer them.
Since the inclusion of additional distractors reduces the influence of blind or educated
guessing, the RMSE are logically decreasing with the number of options for a given
number of items. We can see from Fig. 5 and Table 5 that increasing the number of
options from 2 to 3 significantly reduces the RMSE, even for large n where it becomes
hard to reduce it by adding new items. The gains from increasing the number of options
from 3 to 4 are smaller, and even so from 4 to 5.4
One may wonder whether creating new items might be preferable to devising addi-
tional options, given a fixed number of options summed over all items. This issue has
practical relevance insofar as the total testing time is not extensible and is increasing
with the number of options reviewed.5 To check this point, we compare tests with vary-
ing number of items and options, but constant total number of options, equal to 100.
Table 6 shows that the RMSE hardly varies with test composition. It is almost
equivalent to administer a test with 50 items and two choices or a test with 20 items and
5 options.6
4 See Burton (2001) for similar conclusions.
5 See Budescu and Nevo (1985) for a discussion.
6 The result rests on the assumption that the test-maker is in capacity to find as many as four
plausible distractors (and incidentally up to 50 different items). The consequences of decreasingly effective
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Table 5: Efficiency and number of options per item
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
2 options RMSE 0.407 0.244 0.186 0.140 0.106 0.080 0.057 0.00
3 options RMSE 0.386 0.221 0.166 0.122 0.089 0.066 0.046 0.00
4 options RMSE 0.371 0.211 0.156 0.114 0.083 0.061 0.041 0.00
5 options RMSE 0.365 0.205 0.151 0.110 0.080 0.058 0.038 0.00
Notes. Root mean squared errors (RMSE) are extracted from Tables 12 (2 options), 10 (3
options), 13 (4 options) and 14 (5 options). Baseline model: finite sample-adjusted for-
mula scoring (the notional mark corrects for pure guessing: θ∗ = −1/(m−1)). Examinees
are moderately loss averse: λ = 1.5.
Table 6: Number of items and number of options, tests with 100 options
number of options per item (m) 2 3 4 5
number of items (n) 50 33 25 20
RMSE 0.096 0.098 0.103 0.110
Notes. Baseline model: finite sample-adjusted formula scoring (the notional mark corrects
for pure guessing: θ∗ = −1/(m − 1)). Examinees are moderately loss averse: λ = 1.5.
The number of items × the number of options is kept constant. RMSE: root mean square
error. See Table 15 for detailed statistics.
The quasi-equivalence holds for efficient scoring. Table 7 shows similar results with
FS, NRS, and extended NRS. RMSE varies weakly with test configuration for all three
methods. At a fine level, two options is marginally best for NRS, and three options for
FS and extended NRS.
distractors with the number of options per item are not investigated here. Likewise, including more items
has the potential to cover more content, a benefit not investigated here.
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Table 7: Number of items and number of options, tests with 100 options
number of options per item (m) 2 3 4 5
number of items (n) 50 33 25 20
FS RMSE 0.110 0.106 0.110 0.116
NRS RMSE 0.058 0.075 0.087 0.097
Extended NRS RMSE 0.115 0.112 0.115 0.121
Notes. RMSE: root mean square error. FS: the penalty corrects for pure guessing (θ =
−0.50), the mark for omission is set to zero (γ = 0). NRS: penalty θ and mark for
omission γ set to zero. Extended NRS: penalty θ and mark for omission γ both set to
−1/(m−1) = −0.50. No adjustment is made for finite sample. Examinees are moderately
loss averse: λ = 1.5.
4.6 Quasi-efficient scoring
Quantitative analyses have shown that efficient penalty θˆ does not deviate much from
notional mark θ∗ for n > 5 items (see Tables 9 to 14). In the baseline model, the efficient
penalty is close to the notional mark (about 0.10 points below for n = 10 to 40 and
around 0.01 or 0.02 below for n ≥ 80 (Table 10).
It suggests that a simplified scoring rule with a fixed penalty could provide satisfac-
tory estimation of examinees ability. To check this possibility, scoring rule with θ = θ∗
and optimized mark for omission is compared to a fully efficient model with baseline
calibration.
The two scoring rules produce very similar result. The penalty θ is slightly higher than
efficient penalty, which is compensated by a slightly increased mark for omission, so that
the incentives to omit are globally preserved. The differential marks γ− θ are similar, so
are the proportion of omitters. Overall, the RMSE are very close. The simplified scoring
rule is a pretty good approximation of the fully efficient rule.
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Table 8: RMSE in efficient scoring and quasi-efficient scoring
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
Efficient scoring 0.386 0.221 0.166 0.122 0.089 0.066 0.046 0.000
Quasi-efficient scoring 0.383 0.221 0.166 0.123 0.091 0.069 0.046 0.000
Notes. RMSE: root mean squared errors. 3 options per item. Examinees are moderately
loss averse (λ = 1.5). Efficient scoring: notional mark corrects for pure guessing (θ∗ =
−0.50). Actual mark is adjusted for finite sample. See Table 10 for detailed statistics.
Quasi-efficient scoring: the penalty is fixed and corrects for pure guessing (θ = −0.50).
See Table 20 for detailed statistics.
5 Conclusion
Four main lessons can be drawn from the scoring model. First, a test-maker should
include, if feasible, a large number of items to exploit the law of large numbers. Additional
items proved an effective way to enhance score efficiency, especially for tests with a limited
number of items. Numerical simulations suggest a number greater than 40 and as much
as 100. Raising the number of options per item is another way to improve estimation,
especially from 2 options (true/false type items), to 3 options. Proposing more than 3
options reduces measurement errors to a lesser extent, although the literature on this
issue points to the difficulty of writing more than two plausible distractors (Rodriguez,
2005).
Second, the proportion of omitters and the mark for omission should vary with test
length. If the number of items is large, ability is generally better estimated by answers
than omissions. Omission is dissuaded by setting a negative mark. If it is limited, omission
should be encouraged by a positive mark. The fewer items, the more omission needed
and the higher the mark. The resulting proportion of omitters may be quite significant
in that case.
Third, the omissive behavior of low able examinees is better targeted by the mark
for omission than by the penalty for wrong answers. The penalty is marginally lower
than the notional mark, ie. dissuades omission rather than encourages it. It converges
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gradually to the notional mark when the number of items increases. A fixed penalty is a
satisfactory and easy to implement second best rule.
Last, the instructions, if any, given to examinees should be consistent with the scoring
strategy. If the number of items is small, examinees should be encouraged to guess. In
the contrary case, they should be instructed to answer all questions even if they are not
sure that their answers are correct.
The scoring model allows comparison of the two most used scoring methods, formula
scoring and number right scoring. Both scoring rules set the mark for omission to zero,
which is not efficient. It induces too much or to few omission, depending on the number
of items. By allowing omission, formula scoring is marginally better than number right
scoring when the number of items is limited. The reverse is generally true for longer tests
where ability is better estimated if all examinees answer.
The model has made some simplifying assumptions which implications for estimation
efficiency could be interesting to investigate. First, experimental studies in psychology
suggest that people are generally overconfident about their own knowledge (e.g. Keren,
1991; Yates, 1990). Overconfidence reduces the omission rate and may impact estimation
efficiency, especially if the tendency correlates with ability (Lichtenstein and Bishhoff,
1977; Heath and Tversky, 1991). A related issue is how to score misinformation, which
arises when examinees have erroneous knowledge (Burton, 2004). Second, the tests could
be modeled more realistically by considering items with varying difficulty. Examinees’
probability of being right and their incentives to omit would fluctuate from one item to
another. It could then be interesting to adapt the marks for mistakes and omissions with
item difficulty.
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Appendix I Tables
Risk preferences
Risk neutrality
Table 9: Scoring statistical properties, finite sample-adjusted formula scoring, risk neu-
trality (λ = 1), 3 options per item
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
θˆ 0.00 −0.36 −0.43 −0.46 −0.48 −0.49 −0.50 −0.50
γˆ 0.62 0.33 0.23 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.00
γˆ − θˆ 0.62 0.7 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.57 0.55 0.50
omission bias 40.6 19.7 13.6 9.31 6.36 4.36 2.67 0.00
omitters (%) 43.4 26.0 19.6 14.4 10.5 7.6 4.9 0.00
RMSE 0.406 0.241 0.181 0.133 0.097 0.070 0.045 0.000
Notes. Scoring: the notional mark corrects for pure guessing (θ∗ = −0.50). θˆ: efficient
mark for wrong selections. γˆ: efficient mark for omission. γˆ − θˆ: a measure of the
incentives to omit. Omission bias = 100
(
γˆ − s¯(p)): 100 × estimated omitters’ ability
minus average omitters’ ability. Omitters (%): share of examinees who omit. RMSE:
root mean squared error. For n = ∞, γˆ is the highest mark inducing all examinees to
answer. Any lower value would also be efficient.
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Moderate loss aversion
Table 10: Scoring statistical properties, finite sample-adjusted formula scoring, moderate
loss aversion (λ = 1.5), 3 options per item
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
θˆ −1.79 −0.48 −0.46 −0.45 −0.45 −0.46 −0.49 −0.50
γˆ 0.59 0.30 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.08 −0.16 −0.17
γˆ − θˆ 2.39 0.78 0.68 0.61 0.57 0.54 0.33 0.33
omission bias 17.7 10.81 6.6 3.3 1.0 −0.7 0.00 0.00
omitters (%) 83.5 39.4 30.6 24.9 21.1 18.6 0.00 0.00
RMSE 0.386 0.221 0.166 0.122 0.089 0.066 0.046 0.000
Notes. Scoring: the notional mark corrects for pure guessing (θ∗ = −0.50). θˆ: efficient
mark for incorrect selection. γˆ: efficient mark for omission. γˆ − θˆ: a measure of the
incentives to omit. Omission bias = 100
(
γˆ − s¯(p)): 100 × estimated omitters’ ability
minus average omitters’ ability. Omitters (%): share of examinees who omit. RMSE:
root mean squared error. For n ≥ 200, γˆ is the highest mark inducing all examinees to
answer. Any lower value would also be efficient.
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High loss aversion
Table 11: Scoring statistical properties, finite sample-adjusted formula scoring, high loss
aversion (λ = 2.5), 3 options per item
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
θˆ −1.64 −0.41 −0.36 −0.35 −0.34 −0.48 −0.49 −0.50
γˆ 0.51 0.28 0.21 0.16 0.14 −0.46 −0.49 −0.50
γˆ − θˆ 2.15 0.70 0.57 0.51 0.48 0.02 0.00 0.00
omission bias 8.49 4.44 2.01 0.05 −1.27 0.00 0.00 0.00
omitters (%) 85.7 46.8 38.0 32.8 29.9 0.00 0.00 0.00
RMSE 0.324 0.196 0.151 0.119 0.097 0.072 0.046 0.000
Notes. Scoring: the notional mark corrects for pure guessing (θ∗ = −0.50). θˆ: efficient
mark for incorrect selection. γˆ − θˆ: a measure of the incentives to omit. Omission bias
= 100
(
γˆ − Es¯(p)): 100 × estimated omitters’ ability minus average omitters’ ability.
Omitters (%): share of examinees who omit. RMSE: root mean squarer error. For
n ≥ 80, γˆ is the highest mark inducing all examinees to answer. Any lower value would
also be efficient.
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Number of options
Two options
Table 12: Scoring statistical properties, finite sample-adjusted formula scoring, moderate
loss aversion, 2 options per item
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
θˆ −3.2 −0.96 −0.91 −0.90 −0.90 −0.90 −0.98 −1
γˆ 0.64 0.35 0.26 0.19 0.15 0.11 −0.24 −0.25
γˆ − θˆ 3.90 1.31 1.18 1.10 1.04 1.00 0.74 0.75
omission bias 19.7 11.9 7.35 3.70 0.98 −0.87 0.00 0.00
omitters (%) 87.6 47.0 37.8 31.5 27.3 24.5 0.00 0.000
RMSE 0.407 0.244 0.186 0.140 0.106 0.080 0.057 0.00
Notes. Scoring: the notional mark corrects for pure guessing (θ∗ = −1). Moderate
loss aversion: λ = 1.5. θˆ: efficient mark for incorrect selection. γˆ: efficient mark for
omission. γˆ − θˆ is a measure of the incentives to omit. Omission bias = 100 (γˆ − s¯(p)):
100 × estimated omitters’ ability minus average omitters’ ability. Omitters (%): share
of examinees who omit. RMSE: root mean square error. For n ≥ 200, γˆ is the highest
mark inducing all examinees to answer. Any lower value would also be efficient.
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Three options
See Table 10.
Four options
Table 13: Scoring statistical properties, finite sample-adjusted formula scoring, moderate
loss aversion, 4 options per item
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
θˆ −1.38 −0.31 −0.30 −0.30 −0.30 −0.31 −0.33 −0.33
γˆ 0.58 0.28 0.20 0.14 0.10 0.07 −0.12 −0.12
γˆ − θˆ 1.96 0.59 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.21 0.21
omission bias 16.9 10.7 6.58 3.42 1.17 −0.36 0.00 0.00
omitters (%) 81.6 34.8 26.4 21.1 17.7 15.3 0.00 0.00
RMSE 0.371 0.211 0.156 0.114 0.083 0.061 0.041 0.000
Notes. Scoring: the notional mark corrects for pure guessing (θ∗ = −0.33). Moderate
loss aversion: λ = 1.5. θˆ: efficient mark for incorrect selection. γˆ: efficient mark for
omission. γˆ − θˆ is a measure of the incentives to omit. Omission bias = 100 (γˆ − s¯(p)):
100 × estimated omitters’ ability minus average omitters’ ability. Omitters (%): share
of examinees who omit. RMSE: root mean square error. For n ≥ 200, γˆ is the highest
mark inducing all examinees to answer. Any lower value would also be efficient.
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Five options
Table 14: Scoring statistical properties, finite sample-adjusted formula scoring, moderate
loss aversion, 5 options per item
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
θˆ −1.18 −0.23 −0.22 −0.23 −0.23 −0.23 −0.23 −0.25
γˆ 0.57 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.04 −0.1
γˆ − θˆ 1.75 0.49 0.41 0.35 0.32 0.38 0.28 0.15
omission bias 16.5 10.7 6.63 3.52 1.35 −0.11 −1.30 0.00
omitters (%) 80.5 31.4 23.4 18.5 15.3 13.2 11.42 0.00
RMSE 0.365 0.205 0.151 0.110 0.080 0.058 0.038 0.000
Notes. Scoring: the notional mark corrects for pure guessing (θ∗ = −0.25). Moderate
loss aversion: λ = 1.5. θˆ: efficient mark for incorrect selection. γˆ: efficient mark for
omission. γˆ− θˆ is a measure of the incentives to omit. Omitters (%): share of examinees
who omit. Omission bias = 100
(
γˆ − s¯(p)): 100 × ability estimator of omitters minus
average omitters’ ability. RMSE: root mean square deviation. For n > 200, γˆ is the
highest mark inducing all examinees to answer. Any lower value would also be efficient.
39
Tradeoff between number of items and options
Table 15: Efficiency and number of options for a test with a total of 100 options, baseline
model
number of options per item (m) 2 3 4 5
number of items (n) 50 33 25 20
θˆ −0.90 −0.45 −0.30 −0.23
γˆ 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
γˆ − θˆ 1.03 0.58 0.43 0.36
omission bias 0.31 1.54 2.60 3.52
omitters (%) 26.1 22.0 19.9 18.5
RMSE 0.096 0.098 0.103 0.110
Notes. Baseline model: finite sample-adjusted formula scoring (the notional mark corrects
for pure guessing: θ∗ = −1/(m− 1)). All tests have exactly or approximately a total of
100 options. Examinees are moderately loss averse: λ = 1.5. γˆ − θˆ is a measure of the
incentives to omit. Omission bias = 100
(
γˆ − s¯(p)): 100 × estimated omitters’ ability
minus average omitters’ ability. Omitters (%): share of examinees who omit. RMSE:
root mean square error.
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Number right scoring
Table 16: Number right scoring, 3 options per item
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
RMSE 0.430 0.192 0.136 0.96 0.068 0.048 0.030 0.000
Notes. Scoring: penalty θ and mark for omission γ set to zero, no adjustment made for
finite sample. It is never optimal to omit under NR scoring, whatever loss aversion level.
The proportion of omitters and omission bias are both zero as a result. RMSE: root mean
square deviation.
Formula scoring
Risk neutrality
Table 17: Formula scoring, risk neutrality, 3 options per item
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
RMSE 0.645 0.289 0.204 0.144 0.102 0.072 0.045 0.000
Notes. Scoring: the penalty corrects for pure guessing (θ = −0.50), the mark for omission
is set to zero (γ = 0), no adjustment is made for finite sample. It is not optimal to omit
under formula scoring, when examinees are risk neutral (λ = 1). The proportion of
omitters and omission bias are both zero as a result. RMSE: root mean square deviation.
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Moderate loss aversion
Table 18: Formula scoring, moderate loss aversion, 3 options per item
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
omitters (%) 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3
omission bias −7.14 −7.14 −7.14 −7.14 −7.14 −7.14 −7.14 −7.14
RMSE 0.584 0.263 0.187 0.134 0.097 0.072 0.051 0.031
Notes. Scoring: the penalty corrects for pure guessing (θ = −0.50), the mark for omission
is set to zero (γ = 0), no adjustment is made for finite sample. Examinees are moderately
loss averse (λ = 1.5). Omitters (%): share of examinees who omit. Omission bias
= 100
(
γˆ − s¯(p)): 100 × ability estimator of omitters minus average omitters’ ability.
RMSE: root mean square deviation.
Strong loss aversion
Table 19: Formula scoring, high loss aversion, 3 options per item
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
omitters (%) 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3
omission bias −16.7 −16.7 −16.7 −16.7 −16.7 −16.7 −16.7 −16.7
RMSE 0.497 0.243 0.189 0.155 0.135 0.124 0.117 0.111
Notes. Scoring: the penalty corrects for pure guessing (θ = −0.50), the mark for omission
is set to zero (γ = 0), no adjustment is made for finite sample. Examinees are highly
loss averse (λ = 2.5). Omitters (%): share of examinees who omit. Omission bias
= 100
(
γˆ − s¯(p)): 100 × ability estimator of omitters minus average omitters’ ability.
RMSE: root mean square deviation.
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Quasi-efficient scoring
Table 20: Scoring statistical properties, fixed penalty (θ = θ∗), finite sample-adjusted
marking of omissions, moderate loss aversion, 3 options per item
number of items (n) 1 5 10 20 40 80 200 ∞
γˆ 0.59 0.31 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.09 −0.17 −0.17
γˆ − θ 1.09 0.81 0.72 0.66 0.62 0.59 0.33 0.33
omission bias 26.5 10.3 5.56 2.09 −0.31 −1.90 0.00 0.00
omitters (%) 64.8 40.6 33.3 28.1 24.5 22.2 0.00 0.00
RMSE 0.383 0.221 0.166 0.123 0.091 0.069 0.046 0.000
Notes. Quasi-efficient scoring: the penalty corrects for pure guessing (θ = −0.50), but is
not adjusted for finite sample. γˆ: efficient mark for omission. γˆ − θˆ: a measure of the
incentives to omit. Omission bias = 100
(
γˆ − s¯(p)): 100 × estimated omitters’ ability
minus average omitters’ ability. Omitters (%): share of examinees who omit. RMSE:
root mean squared error. For n ≥ 200, γˆ is the highest mark inducing all examinees to
answer. Any lower value would also be efficient.
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Appendix II Figures
Omission and answer biases
Figure 1: Omission and answer biases for different loss aversion levels
Notes. p¯: ability of marginal examinees indifferent between answering and omitting, s(p¯):
true score, E(s˜; p¯): expected actual score, γˆ: efficient mark for omission, E(s˜; p¯) − s(p¯):
answer bias, γˆ − s(p¯): omission bias. (a) Omission and answer biases are equal when
examinees are risk neutral. (b) If examinees are loss averse, the mark γˆ, which induces
marginal examinees to omit, is drifting to the left (dotted arrow). The resulting omission
bias is lower than the answer bias. (c) If examinees are "excessively" loss averse, the
mark γˆ is moving away from true score. The omission bias may become larger than the
answer bias.
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Efficient mark for omission and test length
Figure 2: Efficient mark for omission in function of number of items
Notes. Efficient mark for omission (γˆ) in function of number of items n (horizontal
line). Baseline calibration: 3 options per item, the notional mark corrects for pure
guessing (θ∗ = −0.50); examinees are moderately loss averse (λ = 1.5), uniform ability
distribution.
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Efficient omission and test length
Figure 3: Proportion of omitters in function of number of items
Notes. Horizontal line: number of items. Baseline calibration: 3 options per item, the
notional mark corrects for pure guessing (θ∗ = −0.50); examinees are moderately loss
averse (λ = 1.5), uniform ability distribution.
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Examinees’ rank and ability
Figure 4: Examinees’ rank and ability in function of the number of options per item,
uniform ability distributions
Notes. Blue solid line: examinees ability for m = 5 options. Orange dotted line: exam-
inees ability for m = 2 options. Rank: examinees’ relative standings. Reading: half of
examinees are less able than examinee whose rank is 0.5. Her chance of correctly selecting
the right option is 75% with two options and 60% with five options.
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Measurement errors and test length
Figure 5: Root mean squared errors and number of items for 2, 3, 4 and 5 options per
item
Notes. Horizontal line: number of items. Green upper line: RMSE for m = 2 options
per item; orange line: m = 3 options; blue line: m = 4 options; lower red line: m = 5
options. Baseline calibration: the notional mark corrects for pure guessing (θ∗ = −0.50);
examinees are moderately loss averse (λ = 1.5), uniform ability distribution.
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